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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-4793 
 ___________ 
 
 PATRICK O. RAWLINS, 
        Appellant 
 v. 
 
NEW JERSEY TRANSIT; SANDRA DURRELL, Principal EO/AA Officer NJ Transit;  
RICHARD R. SARLES, Executive Director NJ Transit; WILLIAM HEMPHILL, Director, 
EO/AA and Diversity Programs NJ Transit; CARL PULSKI, Director of  transportation  
Southern Division, New Jersey Bus Operations; ARTHUR F. BECAN, MD, Medical  
Examiner New Jersey Transit; PATRICE VERNER, Director of Medical Department  
NJ Transit; JOHN AND JANE DOES (1-50) persons who participated in any  
decisions concerning my Disability Termination, NJ Transit, CONSTANCE  
KELLY, Nurse NJ Transit; ORTEGA VANDERHOFF 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey  
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-01574) 
 District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 1, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
  
Opinion filed: June 16, 2011 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
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  Patrick Rawlins appeals from an order of the District Court granting 
summary judgment to the defendants in this pro se employment discrimination action.  
We will affirm. 
  Rawlins applied for a position as a bus driver with New Jersey Transit (“NJ 
Transit”) in 2007.  To obtain this position, applicants must first complete a training 
program, and admission into the training program understandably requires, inter alia, 
passage of a visual-acuity test.  Rawlins twice failed this test.  He complained that the 
testing equipment was inadequate and obsolete, and NJ Transit allowed him to submit the 
results of an eye exam performed by Rawlins‟s optometrist, who indicated that Rawlins‟s 
vision exceeded NJ Transit‟s requirements.  As a result, Rawlins was admitted into the 
training program.  During training, however, Rawlins‟s instructor became concerned with 
his vision.  Rawlins was directed to undergo another eye exam conducted by an 
independent physician.  He refused and was terminated. 
  In March 2008, Rawlins filed a pro se complaint alleging violations of the 
Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
He named as defendants NJ Transit and several of its employees, and he claimed that 
they had discriminated against him on the basis of his perceived vision problem.  He also 
claimed that the defendants had retaliated against him because he had complained about 
the eye-testing equipment.  The District Court awarded summary judgment to the 
defendants.  First, it found that Rawlins could not maintain a Title VII action because 
disabled persons are not a protected class under the statute.  Second, it found that he 
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could not establish that he was disabled or that the defendants regarded him as having a 
disability, and thus could not maintain an ADA action.  Rawlins appealed. 
  We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.  28 U.S.C. § 1291.  When 
reviewing a district court‟s grant of summary judgment, we exercise plenary review, 
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Dee v. Borough of 
Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2008).  Summary judgment is proper, and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of 
that party, no genuine issue of material fact exists.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2009) (current 
version at Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)); Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d 
Cir. 2006). 
  As a preliminary matter, we agree with the District Court that Rawlins 
cannot maintain a Title VII action on the basis of disability.  The statute states, “It shall 
be unlawful [. . .] for an employer [. . .] to discriminate against an individual [. . .] 
because of such individual‟s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(a)(1).  Because Rawlins‟s allegations do not involve discrimination on the basis 
of any of these protected characteristics, Title VII does not apply.  See Washburn v. 
Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2007). 
  A plaintiff asserting an employment discrimination claim under the ADA 
“must demonstrate that he or she is a „qualified individual with a disability‟ within the 
meaning of the Act, and that he or she suffered an adverse employment decision as a 
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result of the discrimination.”  Tice v. Ctr. Area Transp. Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 511-12 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).  An individual qualifies as “disabled” if he or she (1) has a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activity, (2) 
has a record of such an impairment, or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.  42 
U.S.C. § 12102(1).   
  Rawlins does not allege that he is disabled or that he has a record of a 
disability.  Instead, he claims that the defendants regarded him as having a disability.  To 
establish this claim, Rawlins must show that (1) the defendants mistakenly believed that 
he had an impairment, or that (2) he had a nonlimiting impairment that the defendants 
mistakenly believed substantially limited a major life activity.  Tice, 247 F.3d at 514.  He 
can show neither.  First, he asserts that he was the only student in his training class asked 
to read signs from far distances.  The defendants submitted Rawlins‟s instructor‟s weekly 
report, which indicates that the instructor was concerned with Rawlins‟s vision.  He has 
not introduced evidence to establish that the instructor‟s concern was misplaced.  In fact, 
he does not claim that he was able to read the signs that the instructor had asked him to 
read.  He also argues that the defendants‟ insistence, in light of the instructor‟s concerns, 
that he undergo a third visual-acuity test demonstrates that the defendants regarded him 
as having a disability.  However, a request to undergo an independent medical exam, by 
itself, is insufficient to establish that the defendants regard the plaintiff as having a 
disability.  Id. at 515.  Thus, we agree with the District Court that there exists no genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Rawlins is a “qualified individual with a disability.” 
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  Finally, there is no merit to Rawlins‟s retaliation claim.  To establish a 
prima facie retaliation claim under the ADA, the plaintiff must show, inter alia, that he or 
she was engaged in “protected employee activity.”  Williams v. Philadelphia Hous. Auth. 
Police Dept., 380 F.3d 751, 759 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation and citation omitted).  Rawlins 
claims that complaining about the inadequacy of the defendants‟ equipment qualifies as 
“protected activity,” but he has not established that that complaint had anything to do 
with a disability. 
  Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the District Court. 
 
 
 
 
